How about the limitations for UOL external students which is very unfair and will it be removed so all the law grad gets the chance for cbc and then they are judgef

The new rules are found in sections 260 to 264 of the 2006 Act. Claims can be made in respect of acts or omissions, negligence, default or breach of duty by a director or a third party. They may be brought by any member regardless of membership status at the time of the alleged breach. Indeed, claims can be brought by a person in respect of breaches alleged to have occurred before shares were purchased. The act provides notable changes in that in ratification under section 239, no vote by either the director or member whose conduct amounts to negligence, default, breach of duty or trust, or any member connected with him will count. Where the wrongdoing has been authorised or ratified, then the court can disregard it if it has been authorised or ratified by way of the votes of the accused directors. However MSs have not been given a carte blance to sue the majority in that considering whether to give permission to bring an action the court must take into account s263(3), in particular whether the shareholder is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim. It is a two stage test requiring the shareholder to obtain the court’s permission to continue a claim. Firstly the court must bring proceedings to an end if there is no prima facie case; and secondly the court has a discretion to refuse or grant leave to continue a claim, taking account of specified matters such as whether directors acting in accordance with their new duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue the claim; or the matter complained of has been authorised in advance or has been ratified subsequently.

The new provisions appear to offer more protection for shareholders. Part 11 of the Act gives shareholders for the first time a statutory right to sue directors in a derivative action even if the directors concerned have not benefited from their negligence. This is a significant change from the Common Law position Pavlides v Jensen.

However, concern raised that the changes to the derivative action regime could lead to increased tactical litigation against directors from activist shareholders have been unfounded . Thus, the CA 2006 does not formulate a substantive rule to replace the rule in Foss v Harbottle as hoped by some but rather a new procedure for bringing actions based on the existing rules according to the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith. He said, it is a fail-safe mechanism rather than a weapon of first resort and was at pains to make it clear that it is not expected there will be a significant increase in the number of derivative claims. Courts will continue to retain a wide discretion over whether a derivative claim may proceed. It is important to remember that damages are paid not to individual shareholders but to the company itself, and yet it is the shareholder, who brings the action, who may be required to bear heavy legal costs thus the practicalities of financing shareholder litigation will remain a major obstacle to MSs wishing to bring claims.

A dozen years ago, Professor Sealy predicted that, even if Parliament provided a statutory remedy, the courts would reinvent just as effective way of saying ‘go away’.

In view of the CA 2006 Act and recent case law this seems a remarkably accurate prediction. There is nothing in the new procedure that will convince a rational shareholder he should be better off litigating the case on behalf of the company rather than selling his shares. Regrettably, the common law position on costs of derivative claims has not changed significantly either and costs and fees rules need to be re-evaluated if any real change is to occur. The availability of alternative remedies for an aggrieved shareholder is an important factor in determining whether the court will grant permission to continue a derivative action. The court will look at the bigger picture of what is best for the company as well as what is best for the member. In cases where a company is controlled by wrongdoing directors who are also major shareholders it is likely that an action under S.994 will be more appropriate.

This means it may only be in limited cases that the new derivative action will be a useful tool for activist shareholders who want to apply pressure on directors. They will instead be directed towards an action under S.994. This means that any legal action will have to be personally financed by the member and the most likely remedy will be a buyout of shares at a fair value, which in the case of a very small minority shareholding may not be worth pursuing. Nevertheless, s459 plays an important role in balancing the rights of the MS against those of the majority. Without it, MSs would find their investments protected only by the magnanimity of the majority.

Since privatization and budget cuts to education in places like the UK and Australia, nothing could be further from the truth. Getting a law degree from any university in these countries can often mean a disaster as evidence in the quality of the legal profession in Malaysia will attest to.

The vast majority of Malaysian lawyers having graduated from the cliched “top law schools” with “top results who then migrate to places like Australia and the UK remain on the lower level and very low rung of the pecking order of law firms and the profession in general.

Very few make it like the two brothers from Ipoh who migrated from Malaysia in the mid sixties to Australia. One of the two heads the firm of Mallesons Lawyers and has taken silk like his brother.

The remainder of Malaysian lawyers here to a very large extent carry out conveyancing jobs and make short appearances at magistrates courts for traffic offenders and at the Family courts to deal with non contentious divorce cases.

In order to become a good lawyer, a law graduate should sped at least five years slogging and reading. The vast majority do not even realise that this is the case. Many look up to the likes of Karpal Singh the epitome of what a reasonable lawyer ought not to be.