Part II
The third issue pertains to the effects of the APHA on the political climate of Malaysia. In my view, the APHA severely dilutes the spirit of democracy in Malaysia, and reinforces the centralisation of power by the elite few.
Malaysia adopts the British Westminster Parliamentary system. Entrenched deeply in this system is the role of party politics, as the majority in the Parliament determines the appointment of the Prime Minister, and consequently, the Cabinet i.e. the executive branch of the government. Such a system has been described, and criticised, as a system patronage, where the elite few at the top essentially controls the political minds and actions of the many lower party members below. It is not a perfect system, but one that works, with adequate check and balance.
Party politics in Malaysia is well-known. Candidates in constituencies are chosen by party leaders. And once elected, they are expected to agree with the party line, no questions asked. Opposing the party’s bill is tantamount to breaking ranks, and assures the rebellious representative a meeting with the party leaders. In short, there is hardly room for personal opinions, no matter how big or trivial.
In my view, the APHA effectively reinforces the idea of party politics, to the extent that threatens the democratic will of the people. By imposing legal sanctions against anyone who switches parties, it essentially sends the message to voters: “Vote for the party, not the individual”. Indeed, such a mentality is already prevalent amongst Malaysians. But is this a healthy mentality? No, it is not.
Firstly, it divides the political environment into two sides – black and white. Black and whites are absolutes, there are no shades of grey. Parties are built upon the mantra “You either agree with us fully, or you disagree with us fully”. Political goals and policies are formulated by the party leaders, and expected to be followed by each party member. There is no room for dissension. In effect, representatives cannot act on their own principles, but their parties.
True, in other countries, the political environment is also dominated by two strong parties. But they are unlike Malaysian parties, as they do not hold to the adage ‘The Party Is Always Right’. Exchanges of opinions are frequent among party members. The US presidential election is the perfect example – the tightly contested candidate elections for both the Democrats and Republicans, especially in 2008 between Clinton and Obama, bears testament that party principles are not absolute. But in Malaysia, they are. Any party member who disagrees with the party line is compelled to tow the line – failure to do so would lead to alienation and pressure to quit. In such cases, he has no choice but to quit, and embrace another party that accepts his views, or willing to compromise.
In short, anti-hopping law in Malaysia would operate harshly upon representatives because the current party political system in Malaysia is highly intolerant to them being opinionated. Party lines are so clearly drawn that you are either in or out the circle – with the government, or with the Opposition. Party defections are not unexpected, because party loyalty is too high a standard for politicians to fulfill. Thus, imposing a law which punishes politicians from trying to survive in an already harsh and uncompromising political climate is unfair.
Here’s a reminder: that party allegiance only serve as a guidance for people to decide who to vote for. Ultimately, individuals, not parties, are what people should vote for. To enact an anti-hopping law is to artificially reinforce the idea amongst people that we should always look for party allegiance, and only party allegiance, as a determining factor on who to vote. Doesn’t matter if the candidate is an idiot, or a bandwagon hopper, or someone who builds castles without permit – party line is the way to go.
But such a mentality perpetuates the patronage system, and diminishes the spirit of democracy. And even if party politics is the way to go, why do you need a law to tell people that it is so, and to punish people who don’t believe so? Isn’t this against the idea of free will, and democracy, to use legal sanctions to indirectly inform people to vote in a certain way?
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is political freedom. Jean Jacques Rousseau once described the English as being free only once in four years, when elections occur. His criticism makes sense, but it even makes more sense when a law effectively prohibits a representative from changing his mind during his four/five years in Parliament or the State Assembly.
Why should a representative be stuck to his party’s principles? If the party changes its principles during the four/five years, why should he be bound to such changes? Or is he only bound to the principles existing at the exact time he ran as a candidate? But that would mean a party is only bound to its original principles during the election period, and cannot change them in the next four/five years. Either way, it’s restricting political freedom for four/five years. And four/five years is a long time in politics, as any politician knows that.
Human rights lawyer Malik Imtiaz gave the perfect, if rather extreme example, of a party practicing corruption. But the point holds. If a representative finds out that his party does not practice what it preaches, does he not have the right to quit it, and join another party that does? If the party has misled the public with false promises, isn’t this a betrayal of trust? And if the representative choose not to rectify his mistake by switching parties, isn’t this also a betrayal of trust? Indeed, betrayal of trust can occur both ways – by switching parties, and by not switching parties. But the APHA only incorrectly assumes that the former is possible.
(Note: See Malik Imtiaz’s blog for a more legalistic insight into the issue: http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/2008/03/anti-hopping-of-politics-morality-and.html)
To be continue in Part III
(This article is contributed by Raphael Kok, law student of Universiti Malaya)
